Just Who Does the Environment Agency Protect?

A Report of Environment Agency Board Member Alan Dalton

to

The Minister for the Environment - Michael Meacher MP

August 2001.

"As the Environment Agency becomes, as we hope it will, a more effective and confident organisation, we fully expect that it will start to say things which the government may not want to hear."

The Environment Agency, House of Commons, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee Report, May 2000.

Contents:

Summary Introduction The Board Open Board meetings Waste Health and Safety for EA Staff The Board member for the NE Region Conclusion Four Case Studies A. Vibration Disease in the EA B. Stress and Bullying in the EA C. The Byker Incinerator D. The Welbeck Landfill Site Notes

2 3 4 4 5 7 8 10 11 13 18 22 38

Summary

In January 1999 you appointed me to the Board of the Environment Agency (EA). You said in the press release announcing my appointment, "Alan Dalton's experience in promoting the environmental message to a wider public and the perspective he can bring from his knowledge of health and safety matters, will be of particular value to the Board as the Agency deals with the challenges that which lie ahead."

As you can see from the enclosed report, which covers my first two and a half years on the Board, I have tried to make some constructively critical- yet positive - interventions in the areas that I know most about. This has not been easy. Yet, I feel that it is essential that public bodies, and the EA employees some 10,500 full-time people with an annual budget of £655m, are seen to be both transparent and accountable.

For asking questions of the EA that are relevant to the growing public interest in their environment - whether it be an incinerator or landfill site and for taking-up serious employee issues, like stress and bullying- I have been sacked by Sir John Harman as the North East England representative of the Board.

Clearly I cannot carry on trying to do the job you appointed me to do without your backing. This would have to be in public and in real terms, along the following lines:

· To be the Board champion for the employees. The right to attend, as an observer, any EA-union negotiating and/or health and safety meetings. The right to independently investigate employee complaints and to make a report to the Board in the public session.

· To be the Board champion for members of the public. The right to investigate complaints against the EA and make a report to the Board in the public session.

· The time and payment to carry out the above and a re-instatement of my EA allocated time from four days to seven days per month.

In what follows I would like to emphasise that it is my view that the EA has, in the main, an amazing workforce of hardworking, dedicated, skilled and often underpaid people. However, they do not always get the management support and leadership they deserve.

In the spirit of open government, which I know that you support, I have made this report public.

Introduction

"There shall be a body corporate to be known as the Environment Agency...The Agency shall consist of not less than eight nor more than fifteen members...appointed by the Minister/Secretary of State." - The Environment Act 1995.

For those who are not on the 'inner circuit' of the membership Boards, and other bodies, that manage or influence many public bodies in the UK, they are strange animals. What exactly is their role? What powers do they really have? Are they effective? Although I have not carried out a literature search, there does not appear to be much written about in detail about the Environment Agency (EA), its role and functions and successes or otherwise.

For myself, it was all very new. Although I had previously some experience of representing the trade unions on similar, but lower level, committees on the Health and Safety Commission; the top health and safety body in the UK. An experience that was not all-together rewarding (1). In addition, as part of a EU-funded print pollution reduction project, I found out that the standards for smaller polluting processes were, effectively, being set by the industries themselves on the, then, secret Department of Environment Committees. A 1995

Parliamentary Ombudsman enquiry (2) on openness, that I initiated, revealed this fact and gained some publicity.

One of my first introductions to the EA Board was a Fax of the menu for the meeting I was to attend! Was this the real priority and purpose, I wondered? Two and one half years on, it would be fair to say this is no longer the case and we now have massive agendas and heavy papers. But sometimes, in the many, more boring, parts of Board meetings I wonder if it would make any difference at all if the EA Board did not exist? And I am sure many of the EA Directors present think the same although of course they dare not say so. For what it is worth, I have formed the opinion that the real role of the Board is essentially negative. In that, should the EA step out of line with government policy, too much, then the Board will come into action to reign-in the EA. Thus, the first chair of the EA Board, Lord De Ramsey was a personal friend of John Major, the former Tory Prime Minister. The current chair, Sir John Harman, is a safe Labour- supporting pair of hands on the tiller as is the EA's Chief Executive, Baroness Barbara Young a Labour peer.

Maybe this is as it should be, for it would seem silly that a major government non-departmental body (ie a "quango") should be seriously at odds with the government of the day. One of the first lectures I went to, as a Board member was from a senior civil servant telling the Board members that the Labour government did not want any "surprises."

However, the Philips report, over the BSE scandal, showed the vital role of independent scientific advice to government. I personally was forced to get hold of the Phillips' Report after a public meeting (see Welbeck, page 22) over Landfill hazards; when it was quoted to me many times.

And yet, during 2000 the EA launched its 'environmental vision' with some ambitious targets for environmental performance. The EA's 1999-2000 Annual Report says, "Our management has a broad freedom to exercise its responsibilities within a clearly defined framework." Some of the problems of the EA stem from its relationship with government, and whether it is 'just' an environmental regulator or a true 'champion of the environment'.

The Board

We meet about six times a year, for two days, around the eight EA Regions for England and Wales (Scotland has a separate Environment Agency) and at various other times for odd day sessions. In addition, there are various sub-committees of the Board, around a number of key issues; I am on those for industrial pollution and agriculture. Finally, members of the Board act as 'champions' for various issues and/or are regional representatives. I was, until June 2001, the EA Board representative for the North East.

As a Board member you get no induction and this is still true to this day, despite promises from the Board secretariat set one up for new Board members. So, depending on your own interests and time, you have to sort out for yourself what, apart from designated attending meetings, your role is in the EA. This is not easy in an organisation the size of the EA, with 11,000 people scattered over 50 or so different offices in England and Wales. As one of eight regional board representatives, it was a bit easier for me as I had more contact with 'real life' EA issues in the region (see below, under North East). Despite this, it took me a good six to 12 months to find my feet and have some idea what the EA was about and how to try and support it's actions to improve the environment.

Open Board meetings

I have long been a believer in all public, and private, organisations being as open as they can possibly be and such openness is essential in a democratic society. I arrived at the EA having fought a long, and ultimately successful (3), battle to ensure that the UK's main health and safety body, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), was as open as possible. This caused me, and three other investigative academics and journalists, to be branded by the HSE as, "persistent enquirers" during 1998. The Observer noted the HSE action was, "more reminiscent of Russia in the 1930s than Britain in the 1990s."

So I was very surprised to find that the EA Board met in private and that it's papers were all private. Even more so, when it was a fact that the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) had been meeting in open for several years, with no problems according to their secretary, when I wrote to him.

The Board had already come under pressure from you, the Environment Minister, to be more open - to meet in public and allow full access to Board papers - in November 1997; a suggestion the Board rejected. Further, during 1998 Marek Mayer, editor of the influential Environmental Date Services (ENDS) magazine, had been very critical of the EA's secrecy policy.

A confidential (as they all were then) paper, from the Board secretariat, to a Board meeting in February 1999, my first Board

meeting, concluded that, "There is no obligation on the Board to move any further towards opening its business to the public in the light of the proposals in the Government White Paper." And, as we debated this issue during 1999, there were many members of the Board who were very anti-more openness for a variety of good and bad reasons.

Eventually, they allowed an experiment and then full open meetings and papers. But, and it is a big BUT, there is now a Board pre-meeting in private, lasting as long as the public Board meeting! I, and a few other Board members, have objected to this procedure, with little effect. In fact I say very little, if anything, in it reserving my comments for the open meeting where I feel they should be. This has been a bone of contention between the EA chair, Sir John Harman, and me at times.

In addition, the agenda of the Board meetings are usually full of items that do not seem to bear much on the environment and we rarely, it seems to me, to take any decisions of significance.

Waste

As you well know, the growth of waste is a major problem for the UK and worldwide. Municipal waste, alone is growing at 3 per cent per annum. Implying a doubling of the amount in 25 years. Waste minimisation, reuse and recycling efforts are minimal and a new EU Directive will reduce the amount that can go to landfill. This has led to a great pressure to build new incinerators; maybe 100 or more in the next 20 years in the UK alone.

This issue is of major concern to the EA, and it is really the UK's key player. The EA's Annual Report for 2000/01 (page 4) states quite strongly that, “A major strategic issue for the Agency and for society as a whole over the next decade will be how to deliver the Government's National Waste Strategy. We (the Board) discussed this contentious issue in July, noting that the production of waste by society was increasing at an average rate of three percent per year and that landfill options would be progressively restricted as a result of the EU Landfill Directive. We endorsed a strategic approach to the incineration of waste within the context of other waste management and reduction options." Further on in the report, a reader would gain the impression that the EA is very tough on waste and achieving much. As my in-depth case studies of the Welbeck Landfill Site (page 22) and the Byker Incinerator (page 18) clearly show, I feel that the reality is so different.

In my work on waste, I have always felt that waste minimisation and reduction does not receive the priority that it deserves. It should be top of everyone's agenda. In this respect, sometime during the middle of 1999, I was sitting on a coach, next to the previous EA chair Lord De Ramsey, on a Board visit, when a regional EA Officer produced a local report (4) on company waste minimisation projects that neither of us had seen. This led me to ask about other such EA-sponsored projects, and, after some discussion at various committees, to the realisation that the EA effort in this area was being reduced because it was, "non statutory".

I raised my concerns at the December 2000 Board meeting. After which the, then, chief executive, Ed Gallagher, wrote to me soon after (5) to, "clarify the situation on waste minimisation, something you and I are both keen to succeed." But he then admitted that, "In the shorter term, resource constraints may mean that the effort applied to promoting waste minimisation may have to be reduced to take account of other pressures...Doing more pilot projects to demonstrate over and over again that waste minimisation works may not be the best way forward." However, he did not suggest any other ways to advance the cause of waste minimisation.

In February 2000 I wrote to Sir Harman, to protest about the cutting of 37 EA Full Time Equivalent positions on, 'pollution prevention and waste minimisation.' I said to him that I considered this to be, "a retrograde step and totally wrong! I know it is so-called short-term, but this shapes the culture of the EA as an ‘end-of-pipe’ reactive agency and not a proactive organisation. We do little enough to help industry, and now we are cutting what we do! This sends out all the wrong messages to industry, our partners, government and the NGOs."

In March 2000 Sir John Harman asked me to stand in for him at a major conference (6) on Producer Responsibility. It was clear to me, from the papers presented at this conference, that Producer Responsibility was going to be one of the major drivers for pollution reduction at source. In a letter (7) to Sir John Harman, I urged him to take this issue up with the lead agency on this issue, the Department of Trade and Industry. Further, I asked, "Can this be an item for discussion, with a review and action paper, at a future Board meeting." Nothing happened, despite my prompting at Board meetings over the next year or so. Then, in late 2001, Sir John Harman announced that he was asking for a paper and some Board discussion on the End-of-Life Vehicle Directive that is due to become law in April 2002. Better late than never, I suppose.

There is still some waste minimisation activity occurring within the EA. The 2000/01 EA Annual Report notes that, "We are actively involved with over 50 waste minimisation 'clubs' to help reduce water use, production of solid waste and energy consumption." And locally, in the NE region of the EA, where I was the Board's representative until June 2001, 'Project Clever’ helped (8) 10 local Small and Medium Sized enterprises potentially save £275,000 per annum. But these are insignificant examples, in comparison with the amount of actual waste minimisation required within the UK.

With no real effort on waste minimisation, the very real problems with the costs of collection and sorting of recycled goods (not to mention the lack of markets for final products), the reduction required by the EU on landfill operations it is no wonder that the UK waste strategy is seen by the public, and others, as: build more incinerators. And the Byker incident shows (page 18), in my view, that the EA cannot be trusted to police incinerators safely.

Therefore I fully agree with conclusion 182, of the House of Commons Select Committee report (9) on Delivering Sustainable Waste Management:

"From the content of the Waste Strategy 2000, it is clear that the Environment Agency is still failing to take a convincing and persuasive approach to influencing environmental strategy. Although we note some recent improvement in the Agency's performance, it is vital that it becomes a champion for the environment and sustainable development. It must aim to persuade Government of the merits of adopting amore ambitious waste strategy which is based around the pursuit of sustainable waste management."

Health and Safety Issues for EA staff

The EA Annual Report and Accounts for 2000/01 records that: "Responsibility for employee health and safety rests with the Board. We reviewed in detail the overall health and safety performance of the Agency at the mid-point and end of year. There were a number of areas for attention, particularly over "near-misses" and wide regional variations in accident rates. We encouraged the development of a stress management policy to help recognise, address and reduce workplace stress."

This is some understatement! For over two years I have been raising the issue of the large regional variations, among the EA's eight regions, in accident rates to the manual workforce; sometimes the variation is as high as four-fold. Various excuses have been given over the years: a new accident reporting scheme different 'management styles' and so on. Now, at last, there are some signs that the EA may be 'benchmarking' the best region to find out why their accident rates are so much lower; but it has been some struggle.

Elsewhere, I have detailed the issues of vibration (page 11) and stress (page 13) as case studies to indicate why I feel the EA still does not take the health and safety of it's employees - manual or white collar - seriously.

The, then, Department of Environment Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the Health and Safety Commission (HSC), in their joint statement of June 2000, Revitalising Health and Safety, said that (10), "Government must lead by example. All public bodies must demonstrate best practice in health and safety management... All public bodies will summarise their health and safety performance and plans in the Annual reports, starting no later than the report for 2000/01."

By no stretch of the imagination has the EA been a leader in the area of health and safety, and the few words quoted above from the EA's Annual Report for 2000/01, hardly constitute the report required by government. The Health and Safety executive (HSE) have recently (11) admitted that the EA, somehow, slipped through their net when it was first formed in 1995, But it now the HSE says that, "there will be two officers in Bristol monitoring them nationally." For the sake of EA employees' health, I can only hope that this new interest by the HSE will prompt some serious action by EA senior management on these important issues.

The Board member for the North East region

The EA is divided up into eight regions, of which one is the North East, which spreads from Hull and North East Derby in the South to Berwick on Tweed and Carlisle in the North. The western edge is marked by Eden and Pendle, which boarder on the NW EA region.

Soon after my appointment, in January 1999, I was appointed by Lord De Ramsey to be the board member for the NE EA region. I then met with the Regional Director, Roger Hyde, to find out what this entailed. There were no written guide notes and, it appeared, that the Board member could do as little, or as much, as s/he wanted. One of the main requirements seemed to be to attend the monthly Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) meetings in Leeds. The RAP advised the EA Regional Director and consisted of him, Roger Hyde, myself and the chairs of the four EA regional committees that were composed of senior lay people in the

Region, who advised the EA on flood defence, polluting industries and installations, fisheries, navigation and recreation etc. I was given the impression, by Roger Hyde, that this RAP committee had become a bit moribund due to non-attendance of the former Board member responsible for the North East.

When I first met Roger and wrote to him, in March 1999, I set out my agenda for my future action in the NE Region, which included the following points:

· To ensure that, "issues of local environmental concern are discussed and critically analysed at each RAP meeting."

· "I would like RAP to discuss how there could be some independent assessment of the NE, EA Region's activities and effectiveness, the terms of reference of such an assessment, and who might do such an assessment."

· "And that, as an additional safeguard, members of the public, companies, environmental groups, local councils etc. can complain to me if they have exhausted your complaints procedure (ie if they are not satisfied with your response to them!)."(emphasis in the original letter).

These proposals were discussed at a RAP meeting, with Roger Hyde present, and all agreed it was an appropriate approach for myself.

To get to know the area I asked Roger Hyde to organise a three-day, in depth, visit to the Region, it's EA offices and workforce and to see some of the typical problems facing the EA in the region. This took place in April 1999. I made a five-page report and recommendations, from this visit, which I gave to the RAP members and also asked for it to be circulated and discussed by the EA Board. Which eventually took place.

Thereafter followed a series of interesting, monthly, RAP meetings, and many other EA events in the North East throughout 1999 and 2000.

In June 2000 the Regional Director, Roger Hyde, assessed my contribution this way, in my formal EA assessment:

"During his time as the 'North East' Board Member, Mr Dalton, has been a regular attendee at Regional Advisory Panel Meetings and has fulfilled his role as an effective link between the Region and the Board. He has also spent time and effort to improve his knowledge of the Region by attending briefings and visits organised by Regional and Area Managers. He has supported the Region at events such as the Regional Annual General Meeting. On several occasions, he has taken up issues of concern to the Region and been very persistent in ensuring that these are rigorously followed through to ensure that lessons are learned for the future."

However, during the second half of 2000, I was asked by Sir John Harman to look into the Welbeck Landfill site (see page 22) and, in addition, the issue of stress in the EA Leeds Laboratory (see page 16) and the Byker incinerator (see page18) were causing me some concern. I expressed these concerns both to Roger Hyde, and at RAP meetings. In fact I showed Roger Hyde a copy of my Welbeck Report to Sir John Harman, for comment/correction, before I showed it to Sir John Harman. Despite these issues, relations between Roger Hyde and myself seemed to me friendly enough, until his shock formal assessment of myself in May 2001.

Mr Hyde's Assessment of Me, May 2001.

I was sent Roger Hyde's second, two-page, formal assessment of my Regional Board Member's performance in May 2001. To say I was shocked would be an understatement! In almost 40 years of my working life I have never received such a devastating assessment; I had hardly done anything right according to his new assessment.

Why had he not raised any of these issues -either verbally, in writing or at RAP meetings - in the previous two years, was my first question? The main allegations he made against myself were as follows:

· "I have not felt supported, rather the subject of a critical observer.

· Alan has created work for me that has been unhelpful and disruptive. E.g.:

· Alan's involvement in the Byker incinerator issues and discussions with local residents when the case is sub-judice.

· Involvement with RATS at Welbeck Landfill site that undermines the EA staff and the formal consultative machinery organised by the landfill operator and Wakefield Metropolitan District Council.

· Enquiries into National Laboratory Services staff complaints (stress and bullying).

· The regional Board member role is quite unsuited to someone who sees his/her role as an independent watchdog, calling the Region's management and employees to account for their actions."

Of course, I defended myself against these serious allegations. But I refused to apologise for my actions, because, in my view, I was only doing the job I was appointed to do by the Minister, Mr Michael Meacher.

The upshot was that Mr Hyde took early retirement because he recognised, "it is time for a new person with fresh ideas and energy to lead the next stage of the Agency's development in the North East Region." And I was sacked as the EA Board NE representative, by the chair of the EA, Sir John Harman. I made it clear in my letter to Sir John Harman, commenting on my sacking, that I felt he had sacked the wrong man.

Conclusion

Although I have had to miss quite a bit out, this has still been a fairly long report. I feel that it is a vital issue and the public and EA employees should know why I have been sacked as the NE representative. For trying to raise justified issues of concern by both EA employees and the general public, in my view.

Clearly I cannot carry on trying to do the job you appointed me to do without your backing. This would have to be in real terms, along the following lines:

· To be the Board champion for the employees. The right to attend, as an observer, any EA-union negotiating and / or health and safety meetings. The right to independently investigate employee complaints and report to the EA Board in the public session.

· To be the Board champion for members of the public. The right to investigate complaints against the EA and make a report to the Board in the public session.

· The time and payment to carry out the above and a re-instatement of my allocated time from the current four days per month to seven days per month.

Some months ago, at a family event in South London, I was asked by members of my family who live around a proposed incinerator, why, as a member of the Board of the Environment Agency, that waste incinerators were always sited in working class areas nearby where much of my family lived. I could not answer that question, nor can I say they are safe. As an Environment Agency Board member, I feel I should be able to answer at least the second of these questions. In all honesty I cannot.

Four Case Studies:

A. Vibration Disease in the Environment Agency (EA)

"My fingers and hands are painful, numb and clumsy; especially in cold weather. I used to like painting wildlife art; I cannot do that any more. No amount of compensation will pay for what I have lost health wise." - 32 -year-old road driller Stephen Bard who was medically retired with 'vibration white finger' (note: he did not work for the Environment Agency).

The health effects of vibration are still underestimated. The second (12) of my occupational health publications, in 1977, was on the health effects of vibration and what workers' could do to prevent them. When I wrote this booklet, some 24 years ago, the hazards of vibration had been known since 1911and the preventative measures for tools such as chain saw, road drills, grinders and the like were readily available. There is, of course, massive amounts of guidance now available (13) from the Health and Safety Executive on this important issue. Since hat first booklet I have always kept an eye on the literature, written the occasional review article and I have summarised the latest information in a section in my 1998 book (2). The landmark 1995 judgement of Armstrong and others v. British Coal Corporation established that employers should have known about vibration white finger from 1975. In this case seven coal miners with Hand-Arm Vibration Syndrome (HAVS) shared £124,735; with individual awards ranging from £5,000 to £41,085. As the awards indicate, HAVS can be very disabling to the sufferer causing both pain and loss of mobility that leads to a reduction in employment prospects.

The EA employs around 12,000 people, most of whom are technical and office staff. However, there are a significant number, of EA employees, 1-2,000, who are classed as 'manual workers'. They are responsible for flood defences and maintenance, emergency flood evacuation, pollution prevention, the Thames Barrier and so on. It is often heavy and hard work and is, in my view, under appreciated by the EA top management and Board. The EA's manual workforce are represented, in the main, by the

Transport and General Workers' Union (T&G). As I was the national health and safety co-ordinator for the T&G before I joined the EA board, I naturally took a special interest in this somewhat neglected group of workers.

Indeed, in late 1999, shortly after joining the EA board I had written-up (14) an environmental case study of the Thames Barrier, as part of a DETR-funded project. This study showed a clear 'them and us' culture, in the words of one EA manual employees, "the management don't listen to a blind word we say." When I first started at the EA I gave this publication to all EA Board members.

In February 2001 I went to an informal, annual meeting I have with the lay T&G representatives of the manual workforce. This meeting is arranged by their T&G National Officer, Chris Kaufman. At this meetings some representatives raised the issue that quite a lot of their members suffered from vibration white finger, that some were banned from using any type of vibrating tool and that they were worried that they might lose their jobs (in one case it was claimed this had happened).

I was very shocked at this revelation and raised this at open Board meeting the very next week and this caused some consternation. On the 3rd April, Sir John Harman wrote to me saying that, "The Chief Executive has also examined the data relating to vibration 'white finger', and I think we can confirm that staff who have been identified as having stage one of 'white finger' are placed on alternative duties. If this has not been the case, staff and their representatives should be taking this up through the local grievance procedure. If neither of these is the case, I would be grateful for details of the cases." At the May 2001 open Board meeting there was a fuller report on the incidence of Hand Arm Vibration Syndrome (HAVS) in the EA. During the winter of 2000/1, an assessment of 918 members of the EA's Emergency Workforce showed that:

· Two out of three (68%) were symptom free;

· Over 1 in 10 (13%) have earlier (stage 1) signs of HAVS;

· Almost 1 in 5 (19%) have significant HAVS (stages 2 and 3symptoms);

· "It would appear that (in comparison with former years) we have identified a significant increase in the number of stage 2 and 3 cases", and that,

· "We see this as the most significant occupational health issues for the Agency."

After admitting to almost 1 in 3 of the manual staff suffering from vibration diseases, the report also commented, "This will impact on the capability of the Emergency Workforce to carry out a full range of work, as we are obliged to remove people with advanced symptoms from the risk of continued use of vibrating tools." Again, I was shocked, and ashamed, that an organisation that I was responsible for could injure so many of it's workers and care so little about them! No other Board members seemed to care. I asked at the Board meeting if we were using tools (e.g. chain saws, strimmers) with lowest vibration levels and I got a vague, "we are looking into it" type answer. Whether the workers were receiving the best treatment, I received no answer on this issue. And, whether having injured them we were giving them safe alternative work and not sacking them. Giles Duncan, Director of Personal, said, "I think all but one have been re- deployed, where appropriate. Of course, in view of the numbers involved I cannot say that this will be the case in the future".

None of this discussion was recorded in the draft Board minutes, as presented to the Board in July 2001. After complaining of this fact, I am currently trying to get them amended (compare the three –month 'struggle for truth' on stress in the December Board minutes, page 00), to include at least some of this discussion. I am ashamed that the EA has injured these workers, from preventable vibration white finger, and now can even think of sacking them. In May 2001, at the time of my formal assessment, I told Sir John Harman bluntly that I thought the EA's inaction over the well-known hazards of vibration was criminally negligent, under the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act.

B. Stress and bullying in the Environment Agency

Workplace stress and bullying can ruin a persons life. Although I do not take-up individual complaints or grievances by Environment Agency (EA) employees, I have seen documented, and sometimes listened to on the telephone, to half a dozen or more accounts of people who claim their stress was caused by the EA. I have always passed these on to the chair, Sir John Harman, or the Regional Director, Roger Hyde, as appropriate. I have also advised the stressed people to use the EA confidential stress counselling service and to contact their trade union representative. Whatever the cause of these cases of stress I have no doubt that they have had a deep effect on their health and the health of their families and friends. I also have little doubt that, in some cases, the stress has led to serious thoughts of suicide.

Anything that can be done by the EA to eliminate, reduce and treat such stress / bullying should be done; both as a good employer and also because it is required by law. Like many other public and private organisations the EA is undergoing fairly rapid change and increasing pressures. This, inevitably, puts stress on the management and staff, from top to bottom. It is therefore essential that there are polices and procedures in place to deal with stress. This was not the case in the EA until very recently and has largely come about by employee action, enforcement officers from both the local council and the HSE and myself pushing at the Board level. But, it has been very hard and I feel that I have been victimised for my justified concern.

Stress has become the leading workplace health issue of concern for employees in the late 20th and early 21st century. 13 years ago, when I wrote my first report (15) on stress I was concerned to do three things: dismiss the, then common, myth of workplace stress just being an 'executive issue'; ensure that workplace stress was prevented, and not just treated (however good that lunch time massage felt!) and, most importantly, ensure that the trade unions took the issue seriously. At that time it was felt to be a "soft" issue and, indeed some of my colleagues thought I'd gone a bit soft in the head after writing about "hard" issues like asbestos! Now, I am pleased to say that, most trade unions take the issue seriously and I hope to have played my small part in this change.

Now, of course, stress is on everyone's agenda; even the Health and Safety Executive's - so it must be a real workplace hazard. However, the HSE admit (2) that they have found it difficult to enforce the law on their own stress guidance and very few Improvement Notices have been served on this important issue; and no criminal prosecutions have ever taken place. In contrast there have been many high profile common law claims, where stress victims have sued their employer -usually with the help of their trade union - and, sometimes, gained £100,000's compensation. For example, in late 2000, schoolteacher Janice Howell received £254,362 compensation for the stress of teaching. I first became aware that stress might be a problem in the EA in December1999. Michael Ryan, a former EA employee in the Midlands Region, had been advised to contact myself by Owen Tudor, Senior Policy Officer responsible for health and safety at the TUC. Although, as a Board member, I do not take up individual complaints, Mr Ryan said that, in addition to himself, there were quite a few sufferers from stress in the EA and that a local council Environmental Health Officer (EHO), in one of our eight regions, had actually taken some stress enforcement action against the EA. I thought that there was enough in what he said to look into the issue further. In any case there is a legal requirement for the EA to have a stress policy. So I raised the issue of stress at an EA Board meeting on the 15th December 2000. The minutes record, "Stress appears to be a growing factor in society and its incidence in the Agency should be monitored." The minute was actioned for the EA Director of Personnel, Giles Duncan. What the minutes do not record was that there was quite a bit of hostility form some Board members on this issue, along the lines, "the health effects of stress is overrated, good for you and part of the job" type arguments.

I followed this Board discussion, up with a more detailed letter in January2000, asking for more information on stress within the EA. Mr Duncan replied in February, with some general information about stress in the EA.

In March 2000 I was invited to speak to the West Midlands branch of UNISON, the largest trade union within the EA, on the role of the EA Board and on stress in general; as I had written a lot on the subject from a trade union perspective. At that meeting I was given a four-page letter from a Mr A T Goldsmith, Principal Environmental Health Officer (EHO) for Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council, to Ms Stewart the Regional Personnel Manager of the EA in Solihull. The letter clearly stated that the EA was in breach of the law on stress. By September 1999 Mr Goldsmith had concluded his investigations, "and notified the Environment Agency (Midlands office) of what I considered to be three breaches of health and safety in respect of psycho social health from workplace stress:

Regulation 3 - Risk Assessment

Regulation 4 - Health and Safety Arrangements

Regulation 8 - Information to Employees

Of the Management of Health and Safety at Work regulations 1992."

I was shocked to see a letter from a Health and Safety law enforcement officer to the EA! At that Unison branch meeting I promised to take the issue of stress in the EA up at the national level. I also suggested to the Unison branch members that they invite their Regional EA Board representative, Councillor Colin Beardmore, to a future branch meeting (he had been invited to this one, but had been unable to attend), to discuss some of the local issues they had raised, to which they fully agreed.

Yet earlier, on the 17th February 2000, Giles Duncan, the EA's Personnel Director, had written to me that with regard to enforcement action, "There has only been one such case, in the Midland region, which I am told is on a 'minded to' basis and looks unlikely to go any further." I had also asked for any "letters of guidance" from health and safety at work enforcement officers, but he sent me none. Clearly he knew of this letter, as he had contacted that region and the letter was dated four months before. Why didn't he mention the Goldsmith letter?

The EHO, Mr Goldsmith, had been working on stress and the EA (Midlands) region since July 1998, when he received a complaint from Michael Ryan. Upon investigation, although he felt that the EA had acted "reasonably" in Mr Ryan's case -"although a lack of documentary evidence of discussions held and decisions made was a significant weakness" – he still felt that the EA was, "in breach of its duty of care" in relation to stress at work. In March 2000 I wrote to Mr Goldsmith, to find out the current situation, as he saw it, on stress in the EA. In a detailed reply, in April 2000, he was able to tell me that whilst all his requirements, in the letter of September 1999, had not been met he was, "satisfied that reasonable progress on this matter is being made, I will review the situation in July 2000."

In May 2000 the Board discussed a paper on stress in the EA and what to do about it.

In September 2000, through an article in the New Civil Engineer, I became aware that the December meeting of the EA Board were to discuss a proposed stress policy. I met with Giles Duncan, Director of Personnel and Tony Harmsworth, EA National H&S Manager, to discuss this stress policy on the 25th September. At this meeting Giles Duncan presented me with the results of the EA’s Focus Group research on stress. In a letter, dated the26th September, I expressed my concern about this research to him. One was the size: five groups of around 10 - 12 staff, or a sample size of only 60 people, from 11,000 employees. The other issue of concern was the selection of the 60 or some members of these focus groups. Specifically, that they included only one trade union member. Mr Duncan replied to me on the 27th September and I to him, again, on the 17^th October. In this letter I said that I had run his proposals past Professor Cary Cooper, one of the UK's leading occupational stress experts, and he suggested that there should be a baseline sample survey to check on the value future stress reduction/actions. He had completed such audit for several large government organisations and they not only reduced stress but also showed, 'value for money'. As far as I can tell, my suggestion was rejected.

In December 2000 the EA Board discussed the EA national stress policy. This time, at least, there were no Board members who did not think that the EA needed one. I made some points in discussion, that were lost in the subsequent minutes, and eventually appeared - after some arguments with Sir John Harman - in the May 2001 minutes, item 8, as:

"Mr Dalton tabled some comments on item 8 of the minutes (that referred to the minutes of 14th February) relating to the levels of stress in the Agency, the adequacy of the Agency's stress focus groups and the difficulties implicit in identifying workplace stress. He also emphasised the need to provide for independent monitoring of the effectiveness of the Agency's stress policy in reducing stress."

Nationally, the EA now has a paper policy on stress and, from the middle of 2001, someone at head office with a specific remit on stress. We can but hope that this will reduce the amount of stress within the EA.

Stress in the EA's Leeds Laboratory

Several of the people who wrote to me with allegation of stress/bullying in the EA, worked at the Leeds laboratory of the EA. This was in the EA Region I was responsible for, the North East. It should be noted that, in general, I never get involved in individual cases. But, the fact that I received four letters, with allegations of stress and/or bullying, did seem to suggest to me there might be something wrong at the NE Lab. Therefore, on the 1st August 2000 I wrote to the Regional Director, Roger Hyde, asking for a report on the issue at the next meeting of the NE's 'Regional Advisory Panel’ (RAP). The RAP is a meeting of the EA's area director, the EA board representative (myself in this case) and the chair's of the local advisory panels to the EA (four in this case). There is one for each EA Region and they meet about once a month, in the region.

On the 7th August Roger Hyde wrote back in some detail to me thanking me, "for your continued interest in the welfare of our staff" and assuring me that, "appropriate action is being taken to deal with matters. We currently have a formal investigation taking place which is led by a trained investigator from another region." He included data that suggested there really was no problem among the 55 staff adding that, "We do not have any claims for ill health or stress related compensation", apart from two formal complaints, "which have been or are being fully investigated." I responded both to the people that had contacted me and the press with the comment that I was very satisfied with this reply. I requested that the report from the 'trained investigator' be made public and this was noted in the 4th September RAP minutes which also noted that, "The report from the 'trained investigator' was not yet complete." It was my understanding that this report would be ready in early September.

September 2000 came and went, and the press and some of the people affected were asking me where the report from the 'trained investigator' was to be made public. On October the 4th I wrote to Roger Hyde asking for a copy of the report. On the 25thOctober 200 I wrote in confidence to Sir John Harman, putting the facts before him and asking for his, "help/guidance in sorting out - one way or the other- these serious allegations of stress/bullying in the Leeds Lab." I added, "the possibility of an HSE investigation/prosecution hanging over our heads on this one should have focused EA minds and action more than it has done, in my opinion."

In a letter dated 25th October Roger Hyde replied to me on this issue in a most strange way. He ignored my request for a copy of the report of the 'trained investigator' on the Leeds Lab. Instead he referred to the Board's national stress policy; a subject I had hardly ever discussed with him. Therefore, I wrote again to Sir John Harman in confidence, on the4th November, saying how "astounded" I was to receive such a reply. I added that, "Frankly I do not know what to make of this comment from Roger Hyde. I now think that there is most probably a cover-up at the Leeds laboratory, and perhaps some of the allegations current and ex-employees make are true. Further, as the responsible manager, I now feel that he is part of it."

On the 21st November I received a substantial reply from Sir John Harman. On the question of the report by the "trained investigator" I found Sir John Harman's reply confusing. He stated that Roger Hyde's intention was to give me, "a general update" and that he interpreted my request in such away, "in which he probably should not have done", whatever that means! The simple truth is that I was promised the report of the "trained investigator” and I was never given it. He then went onto detail the background to the Leeds Lab problems. Firstly, he mentioned a 'culture study' of about one year ago, which he offered to let me see, "if you wish." Even he had to admit that, "It is clearly however, not the report which you refer to in your request minuted on the RAP of 4 September." He said that a new manager had now been appointed and that we should now give him the, " time and space to provide the leadership which is clearly required."

Although I remained unhappy about Roger Hyde's behaviour, I thought it better to let this pass and look to the future. I replied along these lines to Sir John Harman on the 8thDecember. However, I did request a full copy of the 'culture report' and a progress report on the implementation of its recommendations, if any.

On the 15th December Malcolm Cooper, National Laboratory Services Manager, sent me a full copy of the, "late 1999"'Leeds Laboratory Culture Study Report' by Angel Production Training, and full details of actions carried out since that report. He told me that the report had been confidential but that they were, "actively consulting" staff to make it more widely available, "in order to move forward in a spirit of openness and conciliation." The culture study report detailed a quite horrific working environment for both staff and management and it concluded that there is/are, "a history of, and continuing evidence of bullying and inappropriate behaviour in the management and working culture and styles at Leeds Laboratory=E2=80=A6" It made ten recommendations for action, many of which Malcolm Cooper was then implementing.

This, I thought, would be the end of a rather nasty, and stressful, period for all concerned. How wrong I was to be!

In the early months of 2001 I continued to receive some e-mails and phone calls about alleged stress and bullying problems at the Leeds Lab, which, hoping the above procedure would be implemented, I largely ignored. However, I did take the opportunity of meeting the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) inspector who was investigating the allegations of stress and bullying at the Leeds Lab, in April 2001. I was very impressed, both with his experience and background and with his Knowledge of the occupational stress issue. On the 5th April he had issued a detailed, 3-page letter on the issue of workplace stress to Malcolm Cooper, Manager of the Leeds Lab. He said, in part, "In my opinion there still appear to be remaining residual problems relating to relationships between certain employees and some middle managers=E2=80=A6I advise that a stress survey be carried out in the Leeds Labs=E2=80=A6." This letter gained headlines in the press, such as, "Lab chiefs accused of a hostile culture" (Yorkshire Evening Post, 2nd May) and, "Hostile managers blamed for Environment Agency stress record"(New Civil Engineer, 26th April).

Yet again I wrote, with these details, to Sir John Harman on the 15^th May 2001 concluding, "As I have said many times before, at the Board and in letters to yourself, as a large government-sponsored organised, with enforcement powers of our own, I feel we should be setting higher standards and not be the subject of such letters from a fellow enforcement agency."

On the 5th June 2001 Sir John Harman sacked me as the EA representative for the North East Region of the Environment Agency.

C. The Byker Incinerator, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

"No consideration of the health risks if incineration would be complete without reference to the Byker incinerator in Newcastle. The story is a sobering one: poor operating practices went on for many years and this culminated in the spreading of mixed bottom and fly ash on allotments, footpaths and play areas. This ash was untested but now appears to have had elevated levels of many heavy metals and very high dioxin concentrations. Beyond the direct impact on the local community, this experience has scarred the public's perception of incineration." - paragraph 95, Delivering Sustainable Waste Management, House of Common

Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Select Committee, March2001.

In May 1999 with the then chair of the Environment Agency (EA), Lord De Ramsey, I raised in writing the issue of the 50 - 177 new incinerators that the Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, had recently announced may be necessary to be built by 2010. I commented, "This is a massive building programme and likely to result in many community actions where such incinerators are planned, with the EA in the middle! There was great concern at the NE Regional Advisory Panel meeting that the EA had not fully considered the implications of this announcement...I was requested to ask you...to request a review paper and discussion at the Board as soon as possible."

We discussed the issue of the Byker incinerator at the NE Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) meeting in March 2000, and the issue of the hazards of incinerators in general. I tried to get this issue onto the public part of the Board agenda for their March 15thmeeting, which just happened to be in Durham. I even suggested to Sir John Harman that, "my inclination would be to give the Byker protect group five minutes to present their case to the Board." Sir John Harman informed me that it was too late to alter the arrangements and that, "I appreciate that talking about the specific example of Byker - which is a long running saga - would be of interest to a North Eastern audience, but frankly the Board could not say anything about it in public which would compromise the Agency's authorisation."

Instead, he suggested that I bring it up as a general issue, "and we can take it from there" and that the Board discuss "incineration as a whole" later. This the Board did, at it's July 2000 meeting.

In May 2000 the leading environmental magazine, ENDS, published (16) an article headed, "Regulatory foul-ups contributed to Byker ash affair. "In essence, the article revealed that the ash from the Byker incinerator, in Newcastle, had been spread over local allotments and paths for a six-year period; 2,000 tonnes over 44sites during 1994 and 1999. This incinerator ash had recently been shown to contain high levels of dioxins and some heavy metals. By May 2000, all the ash had been removed by the company, Cityworks, at a cost of £350-£370,000.