Just Who Does the Environment
Agency Protect?
A Report of Environment Agency
Board Member Alan Dalton
to
The Minister for the
Environment - Michael Meacher MP
August 2001.
"As the Environment Agency
becomes, as we hope it will, a more effective and confident organisation, we
fully expect that it will start to say things which the government may not want
to hear."
The Environment Agency, House
of Commons, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee Report, May
2000.
Contents:
|
Summary Introduction The Board Open Board meetings Waste Health and Safety for EA Staff
The Board member for the NE Region Conclusion Four Case Studies A. Vibration Disease in the EA B. Stress and Bullying in the EA C. The Byker Incinerator D. The Welbeck Landfill Site Notes |
2 3 4 4 5 7 8 10 11 13 18 22 38 |
Summary
In January 1999 you appointed
me to the Board of the Environment Agency (EA). You said in the press release
announcing my appointment, "Alan Dalton's experience in promoting the
environmental message to a wider public and the perspective he can bring from
his knowledge of health and safety matters, will be of particular value to the
Board as the Agency deals with the challenges that which lie ahead."
As you can see from the
enclosed report, which covers my first two and a half years on the Board, I
have tried to make some constructively critical- yet positive - interventions
in the areas that I know most about. This has not been easy. Yet, I feel that
it is essential that public bodies, and the EA employees some 10,500 full-time
people with an annual budget of £655m, are seen to be both transparent and
accountable.
For asking questions of the EA
that are relevant to the growing public interest in their environment - whether
it be an incinerator or landfill site and for taking-up serious employee
issues, like stress and bullying- I have been sacked by Sir John Harman as the
North East England representative of the Board.
Clearly I cannot carry on
trying to do the job you appointed me to do without your backing. This would
have to be in public and in real terms, along the following lines:
·
To be the Board champion for the employees. The right
to attend, as an observer, any EA-union negotiating and/or health and safety
meetings. The right to independently investigate employee complaints and to
make a report to the Board in the public session.
·
To be the Board champion for members of the public. The
right to investigate complaints against the EA and make a report to the Board
in the public session.
·
The time and payment to carry out the above and a
re-instatement of my EA allocated time from four days to seven days per month.
In what follows I would like to
emphasise that it is my view that the EA has, in the main, an amazing workforce
of hardworking, dedicated, skilled and often underpaid people. However, they do
not always get the management support and leadership they deserve.
In the spirit of open
government, which I know that you support, I have made this report public.
Introduction
"There shall be a body
corporate to be known as the Environment Agency...The Agency shall consist of
not less than eight nor more than fifteen members...appointed by the
Minister/Secretary of State." - The Environment Act 1995.
For those who are not on the
'inner circuit' of the membership Boards, and other bodies, that manage or
influence many public bodies in the UK, they are strange animals. What exactly
is their role? What powers do they really have? Are they effective? Although I
have not carried out a literature search, there does not appear to be much
written about in detail about the Environment Agency (EA), its role and
functions and successes or otherwise.
For myself, it was all very
new. Although I had previously some experience of representing the trade unions
on similar, but lower level, committees on the Health and Safety Commission;
the top health and safety body in the UK. An experience that was not
all-together rewarding (1). In addition, as part of a EU-funded print pollution
reduction project, I found out that the standards for smaller polluting
processes were, effectively, being set by the industries themselves on the,
then, secret Department of Environment Committees. A 1995
Parliamentary Ombudsman enquiry
(2) on openness, that I initiated, revealed this fact and gained some
publicity.
One of my first introductions
to the EA Board was a Fax of the menu for the meeting I was to attend! Was this
the real priority and purpose, I wondered? Two and one half years on, it would
be fair to say this is no longer the case and we now have massive agendas and
heavy papers. But sometimes, in the many, more boring, parts of Board meetings
I wonder if it would make any difference at all if the EA Board did not exist?
And I am sure many of the EA Directors present think the same although of
course they dare not say so. For what it is worth, I have formed the opinion
that the real role of the Board is essentially negative. In that, should the EA
step out of line with government policy, too much, then the Board will come
into action to reign-in the EA. Thus, the first chair of the EA Board, Lord De
Ramsey was a personal friend of John Major, the former Tory Prime Minister. The
current chair, Sir John Harman, is a safe Labour- supporting pair of hands on
the tiller as is the EA's Chief Executive, Baroness Barbara Young a Labour
peer.
Maybe this is as it should be,
for it would seem silly that a major government non-departmental body (ie a
"quango") should be seriously at odds with the government of the day.
One of the first lectures I went to, as a Board member was from a senior civil servant
telling the Board members that the Labour government did not want any
"surprises."
However, the Philips report,
over the BSE scandal, showed the vital role of independent scientific advice to
government. I personally was forced to get hold of the Phillips' Report after a
public meeting (see Welbeck, page 22) over Landfill hazards; when it was quoted
to me many times.
And yet, during 2000 the EA
launched its 'environmental vision' with some ambitious targets for
environmental performance. The EA's 1999-2000 Annual Report says, "Our
management has a broad freedom to exercise its responsibilities within a
clearly defined framework." Some of the problems of the EA stem from its
relationship with government, and whether it is 'just' an environmental regulator
or a true 'champion of the environment'.
The Board
We meet about six times a year,
for two days, around the eight EA Regions for England and Wales (Scotland has a
separate Environment Agency) and at various other times for odd day sessions.
In addition, there are various sub-committees of the Board, around a number of
key issues; I am on those for industrial pollution and agriculture. Finally,
members of the Board act as 'champions' for various issues and/or are regional
representatives. I was, until June 2001, the EA Board representative for the
North East.
As a Board member you get no
induction and this is still true to this day, despite promises from the Board
secretariat set one up for new Board members. So, depending on your own
interests and time, you have to sort out for yourself what, apart from
designated attending meetings, your role is in the EA. This is not easy in an
organisation the size of the EA, with 11,000 people scattered over 50 or so
different offices in England and Wales. As one of eight regional board
representatives, it was a bit easier for me as I had more contact with 'real
life' EA issues in the region (see below, under North East). Despite this, it
took me a good six to 12 months to find my feet and have some idea what the EA
was about and how to try and support it's actions to improve the environment.
Open Board
meetings
I have long been a believer in all public, and private,
organisations being as open as they can possibly be and such openness is
essential in a democratic society. I arrived at the EA having fought a long,
and ultimately successful (3), battle to ensure that the UK's main health and
safety body, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), was as open as possible.
This caused me, and three other investigative academics and journalists, to be
branded by the HSE as, "persistent enquirers" during 1998. The
Observer noted the HSE action was, "more reminiscent of Russia in the 1930s
than Britain in the 1990s."
So I was very surprised to find
that the EA Board met in private and that it's papers were all private. Even
more so, when it was a fact that the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
(SEPA) had been meeting in open for several years, with no problems according
to their secretary, when I wrote to him.
The Board had already come
under pressure from you, the Environment Minister, to be more open - to meet in
public and allow full access to Board papers - in November 1997; a suggestion
the Board rejected. Further, during 1998 Marek Mayer, editor of the influential
Environmental Date Services (ENDS) magazine, had been very critical of the EA's
secrecy policy.
A confidential (as they all
were then) paper, from the Board secretariat, to a Board meeting in February
1999, my first Board
meeting, concluded that,
"There is no obligation on the Board to move any further towards opening
its business to the public in the light of the proposals in the Government
White Paper." And, as we debated this issue during 1999, there were many
members of the Board who were very anti-more openness for a variety of good and
bad reasons.
Eventually, they allowed an
experiment and then full open meetings and papers. But, and it is a big BUT,
there is now a Board pre-meeting in private, lasting as long as the public
Board meeting! I, and a few other Board members, have objected to this
procedure, with little effect. In fact I say very little, if anything, in it
reserving my comments for the open meeting where I feel they should be. This
has been a bone of contention between the EA chair, Sir John Harman, and me at
times.
In addition, the agenda of the
Board meetings are usually full of items that do not seem to bear much on the environment
and we rarely, it seems to me, to take any decisions of significance.
Waste
As you well know, the growth of
waste is a major problem for the UK and worldwide. Municipal waste, alone is
growing at 3 per cent per annum. Implying a doubling of the amount in 25 years.
Waste minimisation, reuse and recycling efforts are minimal and a new EU
Directive will reduce the amount that can go to landfill. This has led to a
great pressure to build new incinerators; maybe 100 or more in the next 20
years in the UK alone.
This issue is of major concern
to the EA, and it is really the UK's key player. The EA's Annual Report for
2000/01 (page 4) states quite strongly that, “A major strategic issue for the
Agency and for society as a whole over the next decade will be how to deliver
the Government's National Waste Strategy. We (the Board) discussed this
contentious issue in July, noting that the production of waste by society was
increasing at an average rate of three percent per year and that landfill
options would be progressively restricted as a result of the EU Landfill
Directive. We endorsed a strategic approach to the incineration of waste within
the context of other waste management and reduction options." Further on
in the report, a reader would gain the impression that the EA is very tough on
waste and achieving much. As my in-depth case studies of the Welbeck Landfill
Site (page 22) and the Byker Incinerator (page 18) clearly show, I feel that
the reality is so different.
In my work on waste, I have always
felt that waste minimisation and reduction does not receive the priority that
it deserves. It should be top of everyone's agenda. In this respect, sometime
during the middle of 1999, I was sitting on a coach, next to the previous EA
chair Lord De Ramsey, on a Board visit, when a regional EA Officer produced a
local report (4) on company waste minimisation projects that neither of us had
seen. This led me to ask about other such EA-sponsored projects, and, after
some discussion at various committees, to the realisation that the EA effort in
this area was being reduced because it was, "non statutory".
I raised my concerns at the
December 2000 Board meeting. After which the, then, chief executive, Ed
Gallagher, wrote to me soon after (5) to, "clarify the situation on waste
minimisation, something you and I are both keen to succeed." But he then
admitted that, "In the shorter term, resource constraints may mean that
the effort applied to promoting waste minimisation may have to be reduced to
take account of other pressures...Doing more pilot projects to demonstrate over
and over again that waste minimisation works may not be the best way
forward." However, he did not suggest any other ways to advance the cause
of waste minimisation.
In February 2000 I wrote to Sir
Harman, to protest about the cutting of 37 EA Full Time Equivalent positions
on, 'pollution prevention and waste minimisation.' I said to him that I
considered this to be, "a retrograde step and totally wrong! I know it is
so-called short-term, but this shapes the culture of the EA as an ‘end-of-pipe’
reactive agency and not a proactive organisation. We do little enough to help
industry, and now we are cutting what we do! This sends out all the wrong
messages to industry, our partners, government and the NGOs."
In March 2000 Sir John Harman
asked me to stand in for him at a major conference (6) on Producer
Responsibility. It was clear to me, from the papers presented at this
conference, that Producer Responsibility was going to be one of the major drivers
for pollution reduction at source. In a letter (7) to Sir John Harman, I urged
him to take this issue up with the lead agency on this issue, the Department of
Trade and Industry. Further, I asked, "Can this be an item for discussion,
with a review and action paper, at a future Board meeting." Nothing
happened, despite my prompting at Board meetings over the next year or so.
Then, in late 2001, Sir John Harman announced that he was asking for a paper
and some Board discussion on the End-of-Life Vehicle Directive that is due to
become law in April 2002. Better late than never, I suppose.
There is still some waste
minimisation activity occurring within the EA. The 2000/01 EA Annual Report
notes that, "We are actively involved with over 50 waste minimisation
'clubs' to help reduce water use, production of solid waste and energy
consumption." And locally, in the NE region of the EA, where I was the
Board's representative until June 2001, 'Project Clever’ helped (8) 10 local
Small and Medium Sized enterprises potentially save £275,000 per annum. But
these are insignificant examples, in comparison with the amount of actual waste
minimisation required within the UK.
With no real effort on waste
minimisation, the very real problems with the costs of collection and sorting
of recycled goods (not to mention the lack of markets for final products), the
reduction required by the EU on landfill operations it is no wonder that the UK
waste strategy is seen by the public, and others, as: build more incinerators.
And the Byker incident shows (page 18), in my view, that the EA cannot be
trusted to police incinerators safely.
Therefore I fully agree with
conclusion 182, of the House of Commons Select Committee report (9) on
Delivering Sustainable Waste Management:
"From the content of the
Waste Strategy 2000, it is clear that the Environment Agency is still failing
to take a convincing and persuasive approach to influencing environmental
strategy. Although we note some recent improvement in the Agency's performance,
it is vital that it becomes a champion for the environment and sustainable
development. It must aim to persuade Government of the merits of adopting amore
ambitious waste strategy which is based around the pursuit of sustainable waste
management."
Health and
Safety Issues for EA staff
The EA Annual Report and
Accounts for 2000/01 records that:
"Responsibility for employee health and safety rests with the
Board. We reviewed in detail the overall health and safety performance of the
Agency at the mid-point and end of year. There were a number of areas for
attention, particularly over "near-misses" and wide regional
variations in accident rates. We encouraged the development of a stress
management policy to help recognise, address and reduce workplace stress."
This is some understatement!
For over two years I have been raising the issue of the large regional
variations, among the EA's eight regions, in accident rates to the manual
workforce; sometimes the variation is as high as four-fold. Various excuses
have been given over the years: a new accident reporting scheme different
'management styles' and so on. Now, at last, there are some signs that the EA
may be 'benchmarking' the best region to find out why their accident rates are
so much lower; but it has been some struggle.
Elsewhere, I have detailed the
issues of vibration (page 11) and stress (page 13) as case studies to indicate
why I feel the EA still does not take the health and safety of it's employees -
manual or white collar - seriously.
The, then, Department of
Environment Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the Health and Safety
Commission (HSC), in their joint statement of June 2000, Revitalising Health
and Safety, said that (10), "Government must lead by example. All public
bodies must demonstrate best practice in health and safety management... All
public bodies will summarise their health and safety performance and plans in
the Annual reports, starting no later than the report for 2000/01."
By no stretch of the
imagination has the EA been a leader in the area of health and safety, and the
few words quoted above from the EA's Annual Report for 2000/01, hardly
constitute the report required by government. The Health and Safety executive
(HSE) have recently (11) admitted that the EA, somehow, slipped through their
net when it was first formed in 1995, But it now the HSE says that, "there
will be two officers in Bristol monitoring them nationally." For the sake
of EA employees' health, I can only hope that this new interest by the HSE will
prompt some serious action by EA senior management on these important issues.
The Board
member for the North East region
The EA is divided up into eight
regions, of which one is the North East, which spreads from Hull and North East
Derby in the South to Berwick on Tweed and Carlisle in the North. The western
edge is marked by Eden and Pendle, which boarder on the NW EA region.
Soon after my appointment, in
January 1999, I was appointed by Lord De Ramsey to be the board member for the
NE EA region. I then met with the Regional Director, Roger Hyde, to find out
what this entailed. There were no written guide notes and, it appeared, that
the Board member could do as little, or as much, as s/he wanted. One of the
main requirements seemed to be to attend the monthly Regional Advisory Panel
(RAP) meetings in Leeds. The RAP advised the EA Regional Director and consisted
of him, Roger Hyde, myself and the chairs of the four EA regional committees
that were composed of senior lay people in the
Region, who advised the EA on
flood defence, polluting industries and installations, fisheries, navigation
and recreation etc. I was given the impression, by Roger Hyde, that this RAP
committee had become a bit moribund due to non-attendance of the former Board
member responsible for the North East.
When I first met Roger and
wrote to him, in March 1999, I set out my agenda for my future action in the NE
Region, which included the following points:
·
To ensure that, "issues of local environmental
concern are discussed and critically analysed at each RAP meeting."
·
"I would like RAP to discuss how there could be
some independent assessment of the NE, EA Region's activities and
effectiveness, the terms of reference of such an assessment, and who might do
such an assessment."
·
"And that, as an additional safeguard, members of
the public, companies, environmental groups, local councils etc. can complain
to me if they have exhausted your complaints procedure (ie if they are not
satisfied with your response to them!)."(emphasis in the original letter).
These proposals were discussed
at a RAP meeting, with Roger Hyde present, and all agreed it was an appropriate
approach for myself.
To get to know the area I asked
Roger Hyde to organise a three-day, in depth, visit to the Region, it's EA
offices and workforce and to see some of the typical problems facing the EA in
the region. This took place in April 1999. I made a five-page report and
recommendations, from this visit, which I gave to the RAP members and also
asked for it to be circulated and discussed by the EA Board. Which eventually
took place.
Thereafter followed a series of
interesting, monthly, RAP meetings, and many other EA events in the North East
throughout 1999 and 2000.
In June 2000 the Regional
Director, Roger Hyde, assessed my contribution this way, in my formal EA
assessment:
"During his time as the
'North East' Board Member, Mr Dalton, has been a regular attendee at Regional
Advisory Panel Meetings and has fulfilled his role as an effective link between
the Region and the Board. He has also spent time and effort to improve his
knowledge of the Region by attending briefings and visits organised by Regional
and Area Managers. He has supported the Region at events such as the Regional
Annual General Meeting. On several occasions, he has taken up issues of concern
to the Region and been very persistent in ensuring that these are rigorously
followed through to ensure that lessons are learned for the future."
However, during the second half
of 2000, I was asked by Sir John Harman to look into the Welbeck Landfill site
(see page 22) and, in addition, the issue of stress in the EA Leeds Laboratory
(see page 16) and the Byker incinerator (see page18) were causing me some concern.
I expressed these concerns both to Roger Hyde, and at RAP meetings. In fact I showed Roger Hyde a copy of my
Welbeck Report to Sir John Harman, for comment/correction, before I showed it
to Sir John Harman. Despite these issues, relations between Roger Hyde and
myself seemed to me friendly enough, until his shock formal assessment of
myself in May 2001.
Mr Hyde's Assessment of Me, May
2001.
I was sent Roger Hyde's second,
two-page, formal assessment of my Regional Board Member's performance in May
2001. To say I was shocked would be an understatement! In almost 40 years of my
working life I have never received such a devastating assessment; I had hardly
done anything right according to his new assessment.
Why had he not raised any of
these issues -either verbally, in writing or at RAP meetings - in the previous
two years, was my first question? The main allegations he made against myself
were as follows:
·
"I have not felt supported, rather the subject of
a critical observer.
·
Alan has created work for me that has been unhelpful
and disruptive. E.g.:
·
Alan's involvement in the Byker incinerator issues and
discussions with local residents when the case is sub-judice.
·
Involvement with RATS at Welbeck Landfill site that
undermines the EA staff and the formal consultative machinery organised by the
landfill operator and Wakefield Metropolitan District Council.
·
Enquiries into National Laboratory Services staff
complaints (stress and bullying).
·
The regional Board member role is quite unsuited to
someone who sees his/her role as an independent watchdog, calling the Region's
management and employees to account for their actions."
Of course, I defended myself
against these serious allegations. But I refused to apologise for my actions,
because, in my view, I was only doing the job I was appointed to do by the
Minister, Mr Michael Meacher.
The upshot was that Mr Hyde
took early retirement because he recognised, "it is time for a new person
with fresh ideas and energy to lead the next stage of the Agency's development
in the North East Region." And I was sacked as the EA Board NE
representative, by the chair of the EA, Sir John Harman. I made it clear in my
letter to Sir John Harman, commenting on my sacking, that I felt he had sacked
the wrong man.
Conclusion
Although I have had to miss
quite a bit out, this has still been a fairly long report. I feel that it is a
vital issue and the public and EA employees should know why I have been sacked
as the NE representative. For trying to raise justified issues of concern by
both EA employees and the general public, in my view.
Clearly I cannot carry on
trying to do the job you appointed me to do without your backing. This would
have to be in real terms, along the following lines:
·
To be the Board champion for the employees. The right
to attend, as an observer, any EA-union negotiating and / or health and safety
meetings. The right to independently investigate employee complaints and report
to the EA Board in the public session.
·
To be the Board champion for members of the public. The
right to investigate complaints against the EA and make a report to the Board
in the public session.
·
The time and payment to carry out the above and a
re-instatement of my allocated time from the current four days per month to seven
days per month.
Some months ago, at a family
event in South London, I was asked by members of my family who live around a
proposed incinerator, why, as a member of the Board of the Environment Agency,
that waste incinerators were always sited in working class areas nearby where
much of my family lived. I could not answer that question, nor can I say they
are safe. As an Environment Agency Board member, I feel I should be able to
answer at least the second of these questions. In all honesty I cannot.
Four Case Studies:
A. Vibration
Disease in the Environment Agency (EA)
"My fingers and hands are
painful, numb and clumsy; especially in cold weather. I used to like painting wildlife art; I cannot do that any more.
No amount of compensation will pay for what I have lost health wise." - 32
-year-old road driller Stephen Bard who was medically retired with 'vibration
white finger' (note: he did not work for the Environment Agency).
The health effects of vibration
are still underestimated. The second (12) of my occupational health
publications, in 1977, was on the health effects of vibration and what workers'
could do to prevent them. When I wrote this booklet, some 24 years ago, the
hazards of vibration had been known since 1911and the preventative measures for
tools such as chain saw, road drills, grinders and the like were readily
available. There is, of course, massive amounts of guidance now available (13)
from the Health and Safety Executive on this important issue. Since hat first
booklet I have always kept an eye on the literature, written the occasional
review article and I have summarised the latest information in a section in my
1998 book (2). The landmark 1995 judgement of Armstrong and others v. British
Coal Corporation established that employers should have known about vibration
white finger from 1975. In this case seven coal miners with Hand-Arm Vibration
Syndrome (HAVS) shared £124,735; with individual awards ranging from £5,000 to
£41,085. As the awards indicate, HAVS can be very disabling to the sufferer
causing both pain and loss of mobility that leads to a reduction in employment
prospects.
The EA employs around 12,000
people, most of whom are technical and office staff. However, there are a
significant number, of EA employees, 1-2,000, who are classed as 'manual
workers'. They are responsible for flood defences and maintenance, emergency
flood evacuation, pollution prevention, the Thames Barrier and so on. It is
often heavy and hard work and is, in my view, under appreciated by the EA top
management and Board. The EA's manual workforce are represented, in the main,
by the
Transport and General Workers'
Union (T&G). As I was the national health and safety co-ordinator for the
T&G before I joined the EA board, I naturally took a special interest in
this somewhat neglected group of workers.
Indeed, in late 1999, shortly
after joining the EA board I had written-up (14) an environmental case study of
the Thames Barrier, as part of a DETR-funded project. This study showed a clear
'them and us' culture, in the words of one EA manual employees, "the
management don't listen to a blind word we say." When I first started at
the EA I gave this publication to all EA Board members.
In February 2001 I went to an
informal, annual meeting I have with the lay T&G representatives of the
manual workforce. This meeting is arranged by their T&G National Officer,
Chris Kaufman. At this meetings some representatives raised the issue that
quite a lot of their members suffered from vibration white finger, that some
were banned from using any type of vibrating tool and that they were worried
that they might lose their jobs (in one case it was claimed this had happened).
I was very shocked at this
revelation and raised this at open Board meeting the very next week and this
caused some consternation. On the 3rd April, Sir John Harman wrote to me saying
that, "The Chief Executive has also examined the data relating to
vibration 'white finger', and I think we can confirm that staff who have been
identified as having stage one of 'white finger' are placed on alternative
duties. If this has not been the case, staff and their representatives should
be taking this up through the local grievance procedure. If neither of these is
the case, I would be grateful for details of the cases." At the May 2001
open Board meeting there was a fuller report on the incidence of Hand Arm
Vibration Syndrome (HAVS) in the EA. During the winter of 2000/1, an assessment
of 918 members of the EA's Emergency Workforce showed that:
·
Two out of three (68%) were symptom free;
·
Over 1 in 10 (13%) have earlier (stage 1) signs of
HAVS;
·
Almost 1 in 5 (19%) have significant HAVS (stages 2 and
3symptoms);
·
"It would appear that (in comparison with former
years) we have identified a significant increase in the number of stage 2 and 3
cases", and that,
·
"We see this as the most significant occupational
health issues for the Agency."
After admitting to almost 1 in
3 of the manual staff suffering from vibration diseases, the report also
commented, "This will impact on the capability of the Emergency Workforce
to carry out a full range of work, as we are obliged to remove people with
advanced symptoms from the risk of continued use of vibrating tools."
Again, I was shocked, and ashamed, that an organisation that I was responsible
for could injure so many of it's workers and care so little about them! No
other Board members seemed to care. I asked at the Board meeting if we were
using tools (e.g. chain saws,
strimmers) with lowest vibration levels and I got a vague, "we are looking
into it" type answer. Whether the workers were receiving the best
treatment, I received no answer on this issue.
And, whether having injured them we were giving them safe alternative
work and not sacking them. Giles Duncan, Director of Personal, said, "I
think all but one have been re- deployed, where appropriate. Of course, in view
of the numbers involved I cannot say that this will be the case in the
future".
None of this discussion was
recorded in the draft Board minutes, as presented to the Board in July 2001.
After complaining of this fact, I am currently trying to get them amended
(compare the three –month 'struggle for truth' on stress in the December Board
minutes, page 00), to include at least some of this discussion. I am ashamed
that the EA has injured these workers, from preventable vibration white finger,
and now can even think of sacking them. In May 2001, at the time of my formal
assessment, I told Sir John Harman bluntly that I thought the EA's inaction
over the well-known hazards of vibration was criminally negligent, under the
1974 Health and Safety at Work Act.
B. Stress and
bullying in the Environment Agency
Workplace stress and bullying
can ruin a persons life. Although I do not take-up individual complaints or
grievances by Environment Agency (EA) employees, I have seen documented, and
sometimes listened to on the telephone, to half a dozen or more accounts of
people who claim their stress was caused by the EA. I have always passed these
on to the chair, Sir John Harman, or the Regional Director, Roger Hyde, as
appropriate. I have also advised the stressed people to use the EA confidential
stress counselling service and to contact their trade union representative. Whatever the cause of these cases of stress
I have no doubt that they have had a deep effect on their health and the health
of their families and friends. I also have little doubt that, in some cases,
the stress has led to serious thoughts of suicide.
Anything that can be done by
the EA to eliminate, reduce and treat such stress / bullying should be done;
both as a good employer and also because it is required by law. Like many other
public and private organisations the EA is undergoing fairly rapid change and
increasing pressures. This, inevitably, puts stress on the management and
staff, from top to bottom. It is therefore essential that there are polices and
procedures in place to deal with stress. This was not the case in the EA until
very recently and has largely come about by employee action, enforcement
officers from both the local council and the HSE and myself pushing at the
Board level. But, it has been very hard and I feel that I have been victimised
for my justified concern.
Stress has become the leading
workplace health issue of concern for employees in the late 20th and early 21st
century. 13 years ago, when I wrote my first report (15) on stress I was
concerned to do three things: dismiss the, then common, myth of workplace
stress just being an 'executive issue'; ensure that workplace stress was
prevented, and not just treated (however good that lunch time massage felt!)
and, most importantly, ensure that the trade unions took the issue seriously.
At that time it was felt to be a "soft" issue and, indeed some of my
colleagues thought I'd gone a bit soft in the head after writing about
"hard" issues like asbestos! Now, I am pleased to say that, most
trade unions take the issue seriously and I hope to have played my small part
in this change.
Now, of course, stress is on
everyone's agenda; even the Health and Safety Executive's - so it must be a
real workplace hazard. However, the HSE admit (2) that they have found it
difficult to enforce the law on their own stress guidance and very few
Improvement Notices have been served on this important issue; and no criminal
prosecutions have ever taken place. In contrast there have been many high
profile common law claims, where stress victims have sued their employer
-usually with the help of their trade union - and, sometimes, gained £100,000's
compensation. For example, in late 2000, schoolteacher Janice Howell received
£254,362 compensation for the stress of teaching. I first became aware that stress might be a problem in the EA in
December1999. Michael Ryan, a former EA employee in the Midlands Region, had
been advised to contact myself by Owen Tudor, Senior Policy Officer responsible
for health and safety at the TUC. Although, as a Board member, I do not take up
individual complaints, Mr Ryan said that, in addition to himself, there were
quite a few sufferers from stress in the EA and that a local council
Environmental Health Officer (EHO), in one of our eight regions, had actually
taken some stress enforcement action against the EA. I thought that there was
enough in what he said to look into the issue further. In any case there is a legal requirement for
the EA to have a stress policy. So I raised the issue of stress at an EA Board
meeting on the 15th December 2000. The minutes record, "Stress appears to
be a growing factor in society and its incidence in the Agency should be
monitored." The minute was actioned for the EA Director of Personnel,
Giles Duncan. What the minutes do not record was that there was quite a bit of
hostility form some Board members on this issue, along the lines, "the
health effects of stress is overrated, good for you and part of the job"
type arguments.
I followed this Board
discussion, up with a more detailed letter in January2000, asking for more
information on stress within the EA. Mr Duncan replied in February, with some
general information about stress in the EA.
In March 2000 I was invited to
speak to the West Midlands branch of UNISON, the largest trade union within the
EA, on the role of the EA Board and on stress in general; as I had written a
lot on the subject from a trade union perspective. At that meeting I was given
a four-page letter from a Mr A T Goldsmith, Principal Environmental Health
Officer (EHO) for Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council, to Ms Stewart the
Regional Personnel Manager of the EA in Solihull. The letter clearly stated
that the EA was in breach of the law on stress. By September 1999 Mr Goldsmith
had concluded his investigations, "and notified the Environment Agency
(Midlands office) of what I considered to be three breaches of health and
safety in respect of psycho social health from workplace stress:
Regulation 3 - Risk Assessment
Regulation 4 - Health and
Safety Arrangements
Regulation 8 - Information to
Employees
Of the Management of Health and
Safety at Work regulations 1992."
I was shocked to see a letter from a Health and Safety law
enforcement officer to the EA! At that Unison branch meeting I promised to take
the issue of stress in the EA up at the national level. I also suggested to the
Unison branch members that they invite their Regional EA Board representative,
Councillor Colin Beardmore, to a future branch meeting (he had been invited to
this one, but had been unable to attend), to discuss some of the local issues
they had raised, to which they fully agreed.
Yet earlier, on the 17th
February 2000, Giles Duncan, the EA's Personnel Director, had written to me
that with regard to enforcement action, "There has only been one such
case, in the Midland region, which I am told is on a 'minded to' basis and looks
unlikely to go any further." I had also asked for any "letters of
guidance" from health and safety at work enforcement officers, but he sent
me none. Clearly he knew of this
letter, as he had contacted that region and the letter was dated four months before.
Why didn't he mention the Goldsmith letter?
The EHO, Mr Goldsmith, had been
working on stress and the EA (Midlands) region since July 1998, when he
received a complaint from Michael Ryan. Upon investigation, although he felt
that the EA had acted "reasonably" in Mr Ryan's case -"although
a lack of documentary evidence of discussions held and decisions made was a
significant weakness" – he still felt that the EA was, "in breach of
its duty of care" in relation to stress at work. In March 2000 I wrote to
Mr Goldsmith, to find out the current situation, as he saw it, on stress in the
EA. In a detailed reply, in April 2000, he was able to tell me that whilst all
his requirements, in the letter of September 1999, had not been met he was,
"satisfied that reasonable progress on this matter is being made, I will
review the situation in July 2000."
In May 2000 the Board discussed
a paper on stress in the EA and what to do about it.
In September 2000, through an
article in the New Civil Engineer, I became aware that the December meeting of
the EA Board were to discuss a proposed stress policy. I met with Giles Duncan,
Director of Personnel and Tony Harmsworth, EA National H&S Manager, to
discuss this stress policy on the 25th September. At this meeting Giles Duncan
presented me with the results of the EA’s Focus Group research on stress. In a
letter, dated the26th September, I expressed my concern about this research to
him. One was the size: five groups of around 10 - 12 staff, or a sample size of
only 60 people, from 11,000 employees. The other issue of concern was the
selection of the 60 or some members of these focus groups. Specifically, that
they included only one trade union member. Mr Duncan replied to me on the 27th
September and I to him, again, on the 17th October. In this letter I
said that I had run his proposals past Professor Cary Cooper, one of the UK's
leading occupational stress experts, and he suggested that there should be a
baseline sample survey to check on the value future stress reduction/actions.
He had completed such audit for several large government organisations and they
not only reduced stress but also showed, 'value for money'. As far as I can
tell, my suggestion was rejected.
In December 2000 the EA Board
discussed the EA national stress policy. This time, at least, there were no
Board members who did not think that the EA needed one. I made some points in
discussion, that were lost in the subsequent minutes, and eventually appeared -
after some arguments with Sir John Harman - in the May 2001 minutes, item 8,
as:
"Mr Dalton tabled some comments on item 8 of the minutes
(that referred to the minutes of 14th February) relating to the levels of
stress in the Agency, the adequacy of the Agency's stress focus groups and the
difficulties implicit in identifying workplace stress. He also emphasised the
need to provide for independent monitoring of the effectiveness of the Agency's
stress policy in reducing stress."
Nationally, the EA now has a
paper policy on stress and, from the middle of 2001, someone at head office
with a specific remit on stress. We can but hope that this will reduce the
amount of stress within the EA.
Stress in the
EA's Leeds Laboratory
Several of the people who wrote
to me with allegation of stress/bullying in the EA, worked at the Leeds
laboratory of the EA. This was in the EA Region I was responsible for, the
North East. It should be noted that, in general, I never get involved in
individual cases. But, the fact that I received four letters, with allegations
of stress and/or bullying, did seem to suggest to me there might be something
wrong at the NE Lab. Therefore, on the 1st August 2000 I wrote to the Regional
Director, Roger Hyde, asking for a report on the issue at the next meeting of
the NE's 'Regional Advisory Panel’ (RAP). The RAP is a meeting of the EA's area
director, the EA board representative (myself in this case) and the chair's of
the local advisory panels to the EA (four in this case). There is one for each
EA Region and they meet about once a month, in the region.
On the 7th August Roger Hyde
wrote back in some detail to me thanking me, "for your continued interest
in the welfare of our staff" and assuring me that, "appropriate
action is being taken to deal with matters. We currently have a formal
investigation taking place which is led by a trained investigator from another
region." He included data that suggested there really was no problem among
the 55 staff adding that, "We do not have any claims for ill health or
stress related compensation", apart from two formal complaints,
"which have been or are being fully investigated." I responded both
to the people that had contacted me and the press with the comment that I was
very satisfied with this reply. I requested that the report from the 'trained
investigator' be made public and this was noted in the 4th September RAP
minutes which also noted that, "The report from the 'trained investigator'
was not yet complete." It was my understanding that this report would be
ready in early September.
September 2000 came and went,
and the press and some of the people affected were asking me where the report
from the 'trained investigator' was to be made public. On October the 4th I
wrote to Roger Hyde asking for a copy of the report. On the 25thOctober 200 I
wrote in confidence to Sir John Harman, putting the facts before him and asking
for his, "help/guidance in sorting out - one way or the other- these
serious allegations of stress/bullying in the Leeds Lab." I added,
"the possibility of an HSE investigation/prosecution hanging over our
heads on this one should have focused EA minds and action more than it has
done, in my opinion."
In a letter dated 25th October
Roger Hyde replied to me on this issue in a most strange way. He ignored my
request for a copy of the report of the 'trained investigator' on the Leeds
Lab. Instead he referred to the Board's national stress policy; a subject I had
hardly ever discussed with him. Therefore, I wrote again to Sir John Harman in
confidence, on the4th November, saying how "astounded" I was to
receive such a reply. I added that, "Frankly I do not know what to make of
this comment from Roger Hyde. I now think that there is most probably a
cover-up at the Leeds laboratory, and perhaps some of the allegations current
and ex-employees make are true. Further, as the responsible manager, I now feel
that he is part of it."
On the 21st November I received
a substantial reply from Sir John Harman. On the question of the report by the
"trained investigator" I found Sir John Harman's reply confusing. He
stated that Roger Hyde's intention was to give me, "a general update"
and that he interpreted my request in such away, "in which he probably
should not have done", whatever that means! The simple truth is that I was
promised the report of the "trained investigator” and I was never given
it. He then went onto detail the background to the Leeds Lab problems. Firstly,
he mentioned a 'culture study' of about one year ago, which he offered to let
me see, "if you wish." Even he had to admit that, "It is clearly
however, not the report which you refer to in your request minuted on the RAP
of 4 September." He said that a new manager had now been appointed and
that we should now give him the, " time and space to provide the
leadership which is clearly required."
Although I remained unhappy
about Roger Hyde's behaviour, I thought it better to let this pass and look to
the future. I replied along these lines to Sir John Harman on the 8thDecember.
However, I did request a full copy of the 'culture report' and a progress
report on the implementation of its recommendations, if any.
On the 15th December Malcolm
Cooper, National Laboratory Services Manager, sent me a full copy of the,
"late 1999"'Leeds Laboratory Culture Study Report' by Angel
Production Training, and full details of actions carried out since that report.
He told me that the report had been confidential but that they were,
"actively consulting" staff to make it more widely available,
"in order to move forward in a spirit of openness and conciliation."
The culture study report detailed a quite horrific working environment for both
staff and management and it concluded that there is/are, "a history of,
and continuing evidence of bullying and inappropriate behaviour in the
management and working culture and styles at Leeds Laboratory=E2=80=A6" It
made ten recommendations for action, many of which Malcolm Cooper was then
implementing.
This, I thought, would be the
end of a rather nasty, and stressful, period for all concerned. How wrong I was
to be!
In the early months of 2001 I
continued to receive some e-mails and phone calls about alleged stress and
bullying problems at the Leeds Lab, which, hoping the above procedure would be
implemented, I largely ignored. However, I did take the opportunity of meeting
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) inspector who was investigating the
allegations of stress and bullying at the Leeds Lab, in April 2001. I was very
impressed, both with his experience and background and with his Knowledge of
the occupational stress issue. On the 5th April he had issued a detailed,
3-page letter on the issue of workplace stress to Malcolm Cooper, Manager of
the Leeds Lab. He said, in part, "In my opinion there still appear to be remaining
residual problems relating to relationships between certain employees and some
middle managers=E2=80=A6I advise that a stress survey be carried out in the
Leeds Labs=E2=80=A6." This letter gained headlines in the press, such as,
"Lab chiefs accused of a hostile culture" (Yorkshire Evening Post,
2nd May) and, "Hostile managers blamed for Environment Agency stress
record"(New Civil Engineer, 26th April).
Yet again I wrote, with these
details, to Sir John Harman on the 15th May 2001 concluding,
"As I have said many times before, at the Board and in letters to
yourself, as a large government-sponsored organised, with enforcement powers of
our own, I feel we should be setting higher standards and not be the subject of
such letters from a fellow enforcement agency."
On the 5th June 2001 Sir John
Harman sacked me as the EA representative for the North East Region of the
Environment Agency.
C. The Byker
Incinerator, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
"No consideration of the
health risks if incineration would be complete without reference to the Byker
incinerator in Newcastle. The story is a sobering one: poor operating practices
went on for many years and this culminated in the spreading of mixed bottom and
fly ash on allotments, footpaths and play areas. This ash was untested but now
appears to have had elevated levels of many heavy metals and very high dioxin
concentrations. Beyond the direct impact on the local community, this
experience has scarred the public's perception of incineration." -
paragraph 95, Delivering Sustainable Waste Management, House of Common
Environment, Transport and
Regional Affairs Select Committee, March2001.
In May 1999 with the then chair
of the Environment Agency (EA), Lord De Ramsey, I raised in writing the issue
of the 50 - 177 new incinerators that the Environment Minister, Michael
Meacher, had recently announced may be necessary to be built by 2010. I
commented, "This is a massive building programme and likely to result in
many community actions where such incinerators are planned, with the EA in the
middle! There was great concern at the NE Regional Advisory Panel meeting that
the EA had not fully considered the implications of this announcement...I was
requested to ask you...to request a review paper and discussion at the Board as
soon as possible."
We discussed the issue of the
Byker incinerator at the NE Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) meeting in March
2000, and the issue of the hazards of incinerators in general. I tried to get
this issue onto the public part of the Board agenda for their March
15thmeeting, which just happened to be in Durham. I even suggested to Sir John
Harman that, "my inclination would be to give the Byker protect group five
minutes to present their case to the Board." Sir John Harman informed me that
it was too late to alter the arrangements and that, "I appreciate that
talking about the specific example of Byker - which is a long running saga -
would be of interest to a North Eastern audience, but frankly the Board could
not say anything about it in public which would compromise the Agency's
authorisation."
Instead, he suggested that I
bring it up as a general issue, "and we can take it from there" and
that the Board discuss "incineration as a whole" later. This the
Board did, at it's July 2000 meeting.
In May 2000 the leading
environmental magazine, ENDS, published (16) an article headed,
"Regulatory foul-ups contributed to Byker ash affair. "In essence,
the article revealed that the ash from the Byker incinerator, in Newcastle, had
been spread over local allotments and paths for a six-year period; 2,000 tonnes
over 44sites during 1994 and 1999. This incinerator ash had recently been shown
to contain high levels of dioxins and some heavy metals. By May 2000, all the
ash had been removed by the company, Cityworks, at a cost of £350-£370,000.